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ABSTRACT 
The study focused on the effects of corporate governance on Microfinance Institutions financial sustainability in 
Kenya over a period of eleven years from 2000-2011. The study was necessitated by the lack of documented 
literature on the effects of corporate governance in Kenya given the dynamic structure in the liability 
composition of these institutions. The main objective of the study was to investigate the effect of corporate 
governance on Kenyan Microfinance institutions sustainability. The relevant literature was reviewed for the 
purposes of this study. Explanatory research design was used in trying to establish the causal effect relationship 
between corporate governance variable (which were; board size; CEO duality; composition of the board and 
CEO gender) and the financial sustainability of the MFIs in Kenya (measured using ROA). The target population 
were the 42 registered Micro Finance Institutions under the umbrella body AMFI where a random sample of ten 
institutions were selected using the cluster sampling technique. Data was collected from both primary sources 
and secondary sources. Primary data was captured using structured questionnaires completed by the CEOs and 
the senior management team as they were in a better position to comment on corporate governance affairs. 
Secondary data was collected from the Mix market which is the most reliable source of microfinance financial 
data. The study utilized panel data analysis methodology in drawing conclusions about the study. It was found 
that the average board size was 8 members with 10% of the institutions having the CEO double up as the 
chairman.40% of the institutions surveyed had a female CEO. Empirical findings confirmed that board size was 
significant in affecting financial sustainability at 99% confidence level (t values=2.79), CEO gender was 
significant at 99% confidence level (t values=2.487), CEO duality was significant at 95% confidence level (t 
values= 7.69) and board composition significant at 99% confidence level (t values=-2.57). The study 
recommends moderate board size a higher board independence separation of CEO and chairman and a greater 
incorporation of women in the board. 
Key Words: Micro-Finance Institutions, Sustainability, Board Size, Board Composition, CEO duality, CEO 
Gender. 
1.0 Introduction 
According to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP, 2006), Microfinance is the provision of basic 
financial services to impoverished clients who otherwise lack access to financial institutions. The main activity 
of microfinance is microcredit, which refers to the extension of very small, uncollateralized loans; usually of less 
than $100 (Micro Banking Bulletin, 2006). Microfinance institutions are institutions that offer microfinance 
services to the poor. Corporate governance on the other hand is concerned with maintaining a balance between 
economic and social goals, and between individual and collective aims, while encouraging efficient use of 
resources and higher levels of accountability (Kansiime, 2009). Helms, (2006) states that governance was about 
achieving corporate goals. For MFIs, multiple goals exist. The fundamental goal is to contribute to development 
which involves reaching more clients and poorer population strata.  A second goal is to do this in a way that 
achieves financial sustainability, preferably independence from donors. While Rhyne (1998) considers these two 
main goal areas to be a 'win-win' situation, claiming that those MFI institutions that follow the principles of good 
banking will also be those that alleviate the most poverty. Woller (1999) and Morduch (2000) think that the 
proposition is far more complicated. This study sought to investigate corporate governance in Kenyan MFIs by 
studying the impact of corporate governance on financial sustainability. 
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Financial systems as a whole continue to evolve and find new ways to meet demands for financial services in 
emerging markets. The innovative and rapid development of many localized efforts to provide financial services 
to the poor outside of formal channels has generally anticipated government action through new policies and 
regulations (Kansiime, 2009). MFIs have therefore devised innovative strategies to keep afloat in the competitive 
realm of retail lending and deposit-taking operations. The liability structure highlights the primary sources of 
funding for MFIs: equity, donor funds, concessional and commercial borrowings, members’ savings, wholesale 
deposits from institutional investors and retail savings from the public. MFIs differ from each other mainly 
because of their liabilities, rather than their asset types. It is this liability structure that has forced Kenyan MFIs 
to pay attention to corporate governance where the Kenyan government has introduced the MFI Act 2006 that 
stipulates the desired governance structure for the deposit taking MFIs. Apart from the Act, AMFI (Association 
of Microfinance institutions) provides a guideline on how the MFIs should be governed. The need for Kenyan 
MFIs to transform into deposit taking institutions has necessitated these institutions to embrace good governance 
practices. This study traced the effect of corporate governance on Kenyan MFIs financial sustainability. 
According to Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2005), studies on the effects of corporate governance on 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) financial sustainability are quite few and in most cases these studies have been 
carried out in developed nations focusing mainly on large and listed firms. It is also believed that good 
governance brings investor goodwill and confidence. Good corporate governance is important for increasing 
investor confidence and market liquidity that enhance the performance of the firm (Donaldson, 2003). 
Corporate-governance mechanisms assure investors in MFIs that they will receive adequate returns on their 
investments (Shleifer & Vishnys, 1997). In this study, financial sustainability will be measured by the Return on 
Assets (ROA) in relation to corporate governance of selected institutions in Kenya. The corporate governance 
characteristics which were identified by this study are the composition of board members, CEO gender and 
duality and board size.  
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Owing to the lack of documented empirical literature on the effect of corporate governance on Kenyan MFI 
financial sustainability, this study sought to establish whether corporate governance in Kenyan MFIs has an 
effect on their declining performance which compromises of their financial sustainability. Most MFIs in Kenya 
derive their funds from donors and wholesale retailers. These two sources of funds are deemed expensive and 
scarce for the sustainability of these MFIs. As such these institutions have sought alternative sources of funds 
such as public deposits in order to finance their activities and expansion. It is this venture into public deposits 
that has necessitated the need for good corporate governance from both the Government and all stakeholders 
alike. Given the fact that there exists no deposit protection insurance fund for MFI depositors, good corporate 
governance becomes even more important. 
The aspects of governance identified by this study and how they affect financial sustainability of microfinance 
institutions are; independent directors, board size and duality and gender of CEO. Poor performance of 
microfinance institutions has become an issue in Africa and majority of these institutions are beginning to 
embrace corporate governance on their strategic management plans so as to enhance their sustainability. Good 
corporate governance is deemed instrumental in strengthening performance and sustainability of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) as well as increasing outreach of microfinance (Mersland & Strom, 2007). This study 
investigated the effect of independence of directors, board size and duality on the financial sustainability of 
Kenyan MFIs. 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 The Concept of Corporate Governance  
Governance is concerned with the processes, systems, practices and procedures that govern institutions, the 
manner in which these rules and regulations are applied and followed, the relationships that these rules and 
regulations determine or create, and the nature of those relationships. Essentially, governance addresses the 
leadership role in the institutional framework (Siele, 2009) 
Corporate Governance, therefore, refers to the manner in which the power of a corporation is exercised in the 
stewardship of the corporation’s total portfolio of assets and resources with the objective of maintaining and 
increasing shareholder value and satisfaction of other stakeholders in the context of its corporate mission. It is 
concerned with creating a balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal 
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goals while encouraging efficient use of resources, accountability in the use of power and stewardship and as far 
as possible to align the interests of individuals, corporations and society 
According to Deakin and Hughs (1997) corporate governance is concerned with the relationship between the 
internal governance mechanisms of corporations and society’s conception of the scope of corporate 
accountability. Kansiime (2009) observes that corporate governance as the way corporate power is exercised by 
an organization in the management of its portfolio of assets and resources, with objective of maintaining and 
increasing shareholder value and satisfaction of other stakeholders in the context of its mission. It has been 
observed that corporate governance include the structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the 
successful operation of organizations (Keasey, 1997)  
Lapenu and Pierret (2006) argue that when discussing governance, it is necessary to broaden the scope of study 
to include all stakeholders e.g. employees, managers, elected officials, clients, donors, bank partners, 
shareholders, the government, etc. however this study was limited to the board of directors and the CEOs of 
MFIs. Kyereboah-Coleman and Bike (2005) posit that companies have now realized that good governance 
generates positive returns to a firm and boost customer confidence. 
2.2 The Concept of Microfinance  
Microfinance is defined as the provision of financial services, mostly savings and credit to the poor and low 
income households that otherwise don’t have access to mainstream commercial banks (Rock et al., 1998). 
Ledgerwood (1999) defines microfinance as the provision of financial services to low income clients. According 
to Robinson (2001) Microfinance is financial services primarily credit and savings provided to people who farm, 
fish or herd at a small scale and those who operate small enterprises. 
Microfinance industry is the primary source of credit and saving to low income earners. The industry is currently 
growing rapidly and how they are governed therefore matters (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2005). 
Stakeholders in the industry have recognized that good governance is an important element in the success of the 
MFIs (Campion, 1998); (Rock, 1998). In spite this observation, only a few studies have focused on governance 
and the examination of the linkage between various governance mechanism and performance (McGuire, 1999). 
Over the years, the success of MFI in Kenya has been found to depend on one person or a small group of people 
who are committed to the long term goals of the organization. But as the institution develops, new skills become 
necessary and the management team may need to expand and reinforce its skills and put good governance 
structures in place. MFIs in Kenya include Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), Accumulating 
Savings and Credit Associations. (ASCAs), Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs), Non-Governmental 
Organizations NGOs as well as informal money lenders. Some of the MFIs are transforming to regulated MFIs 
(incorporated MFIs) where they can be taking deposit from the public and this call for effective corporate 
governance especially for deposit taking MFIs to protect small unsophisticated depositors (Siele, 2009). 
2.3 Corporate Governance and MFI Financial Sustainability  
The ultimate goal of microfinance sector is to contribute to development and alleviation of poverty. This 
involves reaching more clients and poorer population strata; the so-called main outreach ‘frontier’ of 
microfinance or hardcore poor (Siele, 2009; Helms, 2006). MFIs target is to achieve its main goals in a way that 
achieves financial sustainability, preferably independence from donors. Rhyne (1998) claims that MFI that 
follow the principles of good banking will also be those that contribute significantly to poverty reduction. 
It has been noted that after two decades of inactivity, governments in Africa have demonstrated new 
commitment to reforms and a correspondingly enhanced potential for national development (Kansiime, 
2009).These reforms have targeted governance, decentralization, democratization, economic liberalization and 
contributing to the emergence of a competitive private sector. 
According to Lafourcade et al. (2005), even though MFIs in Africa lags behind other global regions in terms of 
financial performance, a growing number of MFIs, especially regulated and cooperative MFIs are profitable. 
MFIs also lead the world in savings mobilization, in both the number of clients served and the absolute volume 
of savings on deposit. MFIs still face several challenges which include working in rural areas where population 
density and poor infrastructure result in high operating costs. As a result, institutions continue to seek ways to 
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increase efficiency through better communication, improved lending products that respond to clients’ needs and 
modern technology (Siele, 2009) 
According to Brickley (1994) and Byrd and Hickman (1992) good corporate governance enhances MFI 
performance. In spite of the generally accepted notion that effective corporate governance enhances MFI 
performance, other studies have reported a negative relationship between corporate governance and MFI 
performance (Hutchinson, 2002). Accounting based measures for example return on asset, return on equity and 
return on capital employed or market value of equities could also contribute to this inconsistency (Gani & 
Jermias, 2006). 
From the previous research it has been observed that performance improves when the roles of chief executive 
officer and chairman are split, the CEO is a woman and the loans are made to individuals (Mersland & Strom, 
2007; Siele, 2009).  
2.4 Board Size and MFI Financial Sustainability  
It has been noted from the previous studies that board capacity to function effectively partly depends on its size 
(Rock et al., 1998). Although there is no optimum number of board members, the number should not be too 
small or too big. A microfinance board should be large enough to incorporate the various skills, including audit 
skills, legal knowledge, knowledge of the target market and social perspective in order to complete their work 
effectively (without overburdening members), to provide continuity, and to ensure quorums for meetings 
(Council of Microfinance Equity Funds, 2005; Rock et al., 1998; Siele, 2009). It was further stated by the 
Council of Microfinance Equity Funds (2005) that it is important to have people in the board that are politically 
influential so that they can assist with political issues, tap funding, and to enhance public image. 
Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Siele (2009) observe that large boards can be less effective than 
small boards for a CEO to control. The idea is that when boards become too big, agency problems, such as 
director free-riding, increase within the board and the board becomes more symbolic and less a part of the 
management process. To add on that, Raheja (2005) observes that larger boards have higher coordination costs 
and decision making process takes long time though the decision is of equality. Arguably, board size must be 
small enough to accommodate the need for frequent meetings and for the group to work together to make 
substantive decisions (Council of Microfinance Equity Funds, 2005); (Rock et al., 1998). Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) supported the same number of board size 7-9 members, though effective boards may also have eleven or 
more members.  
However, some researchers (Siele, 2009) argue that as board size rises, board activity is expected to rise to 
compensate for rising process losses. Besides, fewer than seven is not generally advisable, as the quorum may be 
small, especially if the management is included in the board. In addition, boards should consist of an odd number 
of members to curb potential deadlocks when votes are taken but in some cases where the size of board members 
in an even number, one would not vote and in most cases the board secretary who happens to be the institution 
manager. The size of the board is measured by the number of directors on such boards. Thus this led to our first 
hypothesis that Board composition has no significant effect on Kenya’s Microfinance institutions financial 
sustainability. 
2.5 Board Composition and MFI Financial Sustainability  
Independence of the board members is particularly important because the board holds management accountable 
and to respond to external actors and issues of external accountability. Investors and donors consider the 
character and independence of the board as assurance that their funds will be used properly (Rock et al., 1998; 
Siele, 2009). Many researchers have underscored the vital role of outside directors in protecting shareholders’ 
interest through effective decision control (Weisbach, 1988). John and Senbet (1998) argued that boards of 
directors are more independent as the proportion of their outside (non-executive) directors are more than 
executive members. Even though it has been argued that the effectiveness of a board depends on the optimal mix 
of inside and outside directors (Baysinger & Butler, 1985), the available details on the determination of optimal 
board composition is scanty. 
According to Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2005), executive directors are more familiar with MFI activities 
and therefore are in a better position to act as monitors with regard to the top management. On the other hand, it 
is contested that non-executive (external) directors may act as professional referees to ensure that competition 
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among insiders stimulates action consistent with shareholder value maximization. Most prior research has 
focused on board composition and has underscored the important role of outside directors in protecting 
shareholders’ interest through effective decision control (Siele, 2009). 
There is no significant relationship, as previously discovered by researchers (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 
2005) between the number of non-executive directors and MFI performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
failed to obtain the connection between board composition and firm performance. They argue that inside and 
outside directors have their respective merits and de-merits. If each board is optimally weighted, insiders and 
outsiders, there would be no cross-sectional relation between board composition and performance equilibrium. 
Another explanation advanced by them is that firms reduce their agency problems to the same residual levels. 
Since residual agency problems are all that matter for performance, variation in performance will be uncorrelated 
with mechanism used (for instance board composition) to reduce the underlying agency problems. The 
independence of the board was measured by getting the ratio of non-executive directors to board size and it was 
expected to have a positive relationship with MFI performance. Thus this led to our second hypothesis that CEO-
Chairman duality has no significant effect on Kenya’s Microfinance institutions financial sustainability. 
2.6 CEO’S Gender and MFI Financial Sustainability 
Women CEOs enhance performance of microfinance institutions and improve sustainability (Kyereboah-
Coleman & Biekpe 2005; Mersland & Strom 2007). Women it is believed could add value by bringing different 
perspectives, experiences and opinions (Siele, 2009). Also it is believed that women generally have higher 
expectations in terms of responsibilities as directors which could influence the board’s effectiveness towards 
productivity (Fonda & Sassalos, 2000). According   to Mersland and Strom (2007) having a high fraction of 
women on the board would help the MFI understand its customers better; which is expected to translate into 
better MFI performance due to the fact that many clients in MFI are women. 
Studies on gender diversity in the boardroom showed that female directors have fewer attendance problems at 
board meetings than their male counterparts suggesting that diverse boards could be more effective and 
productive than homogenous boards. Gender composition also plays a vital role in organization design for 
corporate board (Adams & Ferreira, 2004; Siele, 2009). 
Return on assets as a measure of firm performance is positively and significantly correlated with the ratio of 
women on corporate boards. According to microfinance, polices to promote gender diversity in governance have 
proved appropriate. In regard to gender, prior studies captured female CEOs as a dummy with a value of 1 when 
a CEO is a female and a value of 0,otherwise while gender composition was measured as the proportion of 
women serving on a board to total board size ( Siele, 2009). Adams and Ferreira (2004) show that female 
directors are able to concentrate on the institution wellbeing and are able to represent the clients’ needs since 
majority of them are women. Thus this led to our third hypothesis that CEO gender has no significant effect on 
Kenya’s Microfinance Institutions financial sustainability. 
3.0 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The study employed an explanatory survey design. This study utilized cluster random sampling technique where 
a representative sample of ten MFIs was selected from the 52 MFIs in Kenya. This sampling method was used 
due to the distinctive nature of the MFIs operating in the country. On one hand, there were the deposit taking 
Microfinance institutions that had distinctive governance requirements due to their liability structures and 
regulatory requirements. On the other hand there were the donor funded MFIs that had no stipulated governance 
structures. 
The primary data was obtained through administered questionnaires that targeted the Chief Executive Officers, 
the senior management team, since they are in a better position to have all the information pertaining corporate 
governance in their organizations.  
On the other hand, secondary data was collected using a data collection schedule and was mainly derived from 
the annual financial reports starting from the year 2000 to the year 2011 and board meetings minutes. 
Additionally, vital financial data was obtained from the Mix Market which is the most reliable source of 
microfinance financial data. 
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The general regression model adopted by the study is outlined below; 
ROAit= αit +βit GOV+ µ it…………………………………………………….……Equation: 1 
ROA is the proxy for MFIs sustainability (dependent variable) and represents Return on Assets (ROA) of the 
MFIs under study. 
α is the intercept (y intercept), βit  is slope coefficients of explanatory variables. Where subscript i denote the 
individual institutions characteristics across time dimension t. 
GOV is vector of governance (independent) variables which are; board size, board composition, CEO gender and 
CEO duality. 
Board Size (B.S), is the number of board members for the MFIs during the period under review. 
Board Composition (B.C), number of outside directors and women out of total number of directors for the MFIs 
during the period under review. 
Gender (CEOGEN) captured whether a CEO was a female or otherwise, it adopted a dummy variable where, 1 
was if CEO was a female and 0 if otherwise for the MFIs under review. 
CEO duality (CEOD) captured if the board chairperson was the same as the CEO or otherwise. 1 if CEO doubles 
as chairman and 0 if does not double as chair. 
µ it was the error term (residual variable) and represents the unobservable MFIs characteristics not captured in 
the model. The error term was a two way error component model which is specified in equation 2 below and was 
used to test the robustness of the estimation model. 
µ it = αi + λt + νit……………………………………………………2 
Where; αi denotes the unobservable individual MFI specific effects, λt denotes the unobservable time effect and 
νit is the remainder stochastic disturbance term. The robustness of the model was tested using the fixed effects 
and random effect two way error component models. Under the fixed effect model, the αi and the λt are assumed 
to be fixed parameters to be estimated and the remainder disturbances stochastic with νit∼ IID (0, σ 2ν ). The Xi t 
are assumed independent of the νit for all i and t (Batalagi, 2005). in this case,the juijMFI specific unobserved 
variables such as culture experience and regulation are taken care of. The random effects model on the other 
hand the αi ∼ IID (0, σ 2α), λt ∼ IID (0, σ 2λ) and νit ∼ IID(0, σ2 ν ) are independent of each other. In addition, Xit 
is independent of μi, λt and νit for all i accordingly any correlations between the error term and the independent 
variables is taken care of. 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Correlation Analysis Results 
4.1.1 Correlation between Board Size, Board Composition and MFI financial sustainability  
The study objective was to examine the board size and its composition and the effect on the financial 
sustainability of the MFIs. The result shown on the table 1 shows that the average size of MFIs directors is 8 
members which is well within the recommendation of  council of microfinance equity funds which is 7 to 9 
members. The standard deviation was 2.68 and maximum board size of 18 and a minimum of 4 board members 
suggesting that they were widely dispersed. Jensen (1993)  and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) observed that large 
board size are less effective for the firm financial sustainability because board members take long to make 
decisions and to agree on matters concerning the organization. Coordination of large board is also difficult 
especially when they are required for meetings. This pushes the cost up especially if there are many international 
directors whose travel and other expenses the MFI must facilitate (Raheja, 2005). 
The composition of non-executive board members is measured as a ratio of total non-executive members divided 
by total board members while composition of women serving in the board was taken as a ratio of total women in 
the board divided by total board members. Descriptive results from table 1 show that women who serve in the 
board are fewer than men at an average of 34% of total board members. In some of the MFIs there were no 
women serving in the board in particular years and that is why the minimum number is 0%. Since MFIs in 
Kenya offer services to both men and women men have dominated these boards. A point to note is that majority 
of MFIs clientele are women because of the position they hold in the society. In one MFI (KWFT) there were 
100% women in the board since that MFI was offering services to women only. It has been observed Hartarsaka 
(2004) that boards that have higher number of women reach more poor borrowers as well as being more 
profitable. 
Most MFIs have a higher degree of independence since they have more non-executive directors in the board. The 
average mean percentage of non-executive directors is 83% while median is 87%. Non-executive directors are 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.30, 2014 
 
77 
able to make independent decisions without the influence of management and they play an oversight role since 
management cannot check itself (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2005). Jensen (1993) observes that boards that 
have non-executive directors from diverse background and skills perform better. 
4.1.2 Correlation between Duality and Gender of CEO and MFI financial sustainability 
The study showed that 10% of all MFIs had CEOs who also doubled as the board chairperson which generated a 
lot of conflict since the management could not check itself especially when decision control and decision 
management functions were embedded in one position. On the other hand 90% of MFIs had two individuals 
occupying the positions of board chairperson and CEO which gave the board enough power to make independent 
decision and also act as oversight body for the management. CEO duality was a dummy variable which was 
allocated 1 when CEO combined as the board chairperson and 0 if otherwise. 
The study also examined the effects of gender as proxy for corporate board diversity on performance of MFIs. 
The gender of CEO was a dummy variable which was allocated 1 when CEO was a woman and 0 when 
otherwise. The table 2 shows that 75% of MFIs were led by male CEOs this is despite the fact that their target 
clientele were mainly women. This left only 35% of selected MFIs led by women. MFIs perform better when 
CEO is a woman because she able to connects well with clients who are mostly women (Mersland & Strom, 
2007). Most of the selected MFIs were owned by NGOs and personnel appointed to run affairs of these 
organizations were from within these NGOs and in most cases the chances of recruiting a man was highly likely 
since most of workers in these NGOs were men.  
4.1.3 Correlation between CEO Attributes and MFI financial sustainability  
ROA represent the performance of MFI which is a dependent variable and it is measured by total profit divided 
by total assets. CEOD is CEO duality and it was a dummy variable which was allocated 1 when the CEO 
doubled as board chairperson and 0 if otherwise; CEOGEN represented the gender of CEO and since it was 
qualitative it was allocated dummy variable 1 when CEO was a woman and 0 if otherwise. 
The table 3 shows that there is negative correlation between CEO duality and MFI financial sustainability 
because of conflict of interest since the CEO cannot check himself. When CEO doubles as chairperson there is a 
high chance of managerialism and agency problem (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Bickley, Coles and Jarrel (1997) also 
observe that when decision management and control are left to the CEO, it reduces board’s effectiveness in 
monitoring the management impacting negatively on financial sustainability of MFI. According to this study 
there should be a separation of roles between CEO and chairperson of the board for these institutions to boost 
their performance. It has also been observed that firms are more valuable when there is separation of roles 
between CEO and chairperson (Siele, 2009; Yermack, 1996; Sanda, 2003). 
As shown from table 3 CEOGEN which represent CEOs, gender has a positive correlation with performance 
(ROA). This can be attributed by the fact that most of the MFIs clients are women and they are likely to be 
attracted more to those institutions where CEO is a woman. Other studies for instance Mersland and Strom 
(2007) also support this finding that MFI is likely to perform better when CEO is a woman 
4.2 Empirical Results 
Table 4 shows the panel estimation results based on the baseline model where return on asset is the dependent 
variable and the governance variables are the independent variables. To check for robustness of the results, fixed 
and random effects estimates are regressed as shown in table 4. The regressions were aimed at fulfilling the 
objectives of the study which entailed testing the hypothesis. The first hypothesis set out by the study was that 
board size had no effect on the financial sustainability of Kenyan MFIs. The results of the study rejected this null 
hypothesis as board size (B.S) had a positive and significant relationship (t values=2.74) on the MFIs financial 
sustainability at 99% level of confidence. After conducting robustness checks using the fixed effects model 
where the MFIs specific characteristics were taken care of, board size still remained significant.  
Secondly, the study postulated that board composition has no effect on Kenya’s Microfinance institutions 
financial sustainability. The results of the study rejected this hypothesis at 95% confidence level, where the 
coefficient of 0.09 (t values=-2.57) was found to have a positive and significant effect on the MFIs financial 
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sustainability. The robust checks using fixed effects models confirmed these results as indicated by column six 
on our output table where the board composition remained significant at 90%.  
Thirdly, the study predicted that CEO-Chairperson duality had no effect on Kenya’s Microfinance institutions 
financial sustainability. The null hypothesis was rejected by the results of the study where CEO-Chairperson 
duality was found to have a positive and significant effect on the financial sustainability of MFIs. Column one 
that presents the pooled model results indicate that CEO duality coefficient of 1.06 was significant at 95% in 
determining the financial sustainability of the Kenyan MFIs. The robust checks as presented by column five 
where the MFI specific unobservable characteristics are taken care of confirmed the results of the statistical 
findings although they gave a negative coefficient.  Finally, the study hypothesized that CEO gender had no 
significant effect on Kenya’s Microfinance Institutions financial sustainability. The results of the study rejected 
this hypothesis at 99% confidence level where the coefficient of 0.045 was found to be statistically significant in 
determining the financial sustainability of MFIs financial sustainability. Under the fixed effects model, the same 
findings revealed that CEO- gender was quite significant in determining the financial sustainability of the MFIs. 
It is worth noting that the pooled model takes care of any correlation between the error term and the independent 
variables. Also the fixed effect estimates allow for cross sectional weighting of the variables as opposed to the 
pooled model and hence the reason as to why the r squared was high under the fixed effect model as opposed to 
the random effect model. 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
Corporate governance practices plays an important role in the operation of Microfinance institutions for 
enhanced financial sustainability, the findings of the study reveal that board diversity of a moderate board size 
with a considerable number of women is better placed to ensure independence of the board hence boosting 
financial sustainability. From the study it was also clear that MFI boards could enhance financial sustainability 
by having directors with diverse expertise and skills. A moderate board size is likely to improve whereas more 
diverse board is likely to have better relations with other stakeholders. 
According to the findings of CEO duality, it was established that separation of board chairman and CEO 
positions is vital in MFIs because this minimizes the tension between CEO and board members thus influencing 
positively the financial sustainability of MFIs and it also reduces conflict of interest from the CEO. Several 
scholars, mostly notably (Jensen, 1993; Siele, 2009), have argued that the lack of independent leadership in firms 
where the CEO is also the chairman results in less monitoring of top management and consequently more severe 
agency problems. Given that a key function of the board is to determine who should serve as CEO, Jensen and 
other scholars argue that the board cannot effectively replace poorly performing Managers when the CEO and 
chairman tittles are vested in one individual. The study concluded there should be a separation of roles between 
CEO and chairperson of the board for these institutions to boost their performance. It has also been noted that 
firms are more valuable when there is separation of roles between CEO and chairperson (Siele, 2009; Yermack, 
1996; Sanda, 2003). 
From the findings it was also evident that MFI financial sustainability is enhanced when the CEO is a female this 
could be true as most of the MFIs customers in Kenya are women and the CEO being a woman is likely to attract 
more women to invest in MFI, thus, allows the MFIs to increase its profitability. Fondas and Sassalos (2000) 
have also argued that women generally have higher expectations in terms of their responsibilities as CEOs which 
could influence the board’s effectiveness towards productivity. 
The results of the study show that good governance structure is important in the young and immature 
microfinance industry as it has an effect on the institution performance. The observations of the study does not 
only aim at fine-tuning governance in MFIs in terms of policy direction, but equally important to ensure collapse 
of MFIs as a result of governance is forestalled so as not to dent the critical process of poverty reduction and 
development. 
6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the study it is clear that corporate governance practices have an influence on MFI performance in Kenya. 
Hence, there is a need to strike a good balance between quality and quantity with regards to board sizes. It is 
recommended that MFI board size should be fairly large and not too large that will discourage investors 
especially shareholders. Also, the board size should be of quality with board members having diverse skills and 
experience. It is recommended in tandem with others, that MFIs should make more use of non-executive 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.30, 2014 
 
79 
directors, also policies to promote gender diversity in governance have deemed appropriate therefore MFIs are 
required to increase the ratio of women on the board so as to ensure board independence, promote shareholder 
value by enhancing institution financial sustainability as this send a positive signal to potential investors and 
shareholders. 
As a result of positive effect of CEO duality on MFI financial sustainability, there is need for firms to separate 
the post of CEO and Chair in order to ensure optimal performance. The separation of position of CEO and Chair 
will encourage efficiency in decision-making mechanisms. It would also serve as monitoring mechanism to 
ensure that the agent does not indulge in opportunistic behavior. Also, the MFI need to maintain and operate 
with relatively independent boards. 
6.1 RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The debate on corporate governance continues both in academic circles and popular press, and both at domestic 
and international levels this shows that this field needs more attention. Although this study contributes to the 
body of literature on various dimensions, the results are not conclusive. Observations covering a period of five 
years and in one country may not be representative, and the results may not be generally applicable to 
developing countries.  
The sample in this study was dictated by the availability of data and the choice of statistical analysis was 
determined by the period and MFI covered. Also the results must also be carefully handled since many specific 
environmental factors can impact MFI’s working process. It would therefore, be desirable to extend the present 
study by complementing it with studies using other methods and including comparative data. The inclusion of 
other corporate governance and performance variables such social performance indicators as this would also 
merit further considerations. More research on practices of board is needed to assess the effects on MFIs 
performance.  
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TABLES 
Table 1 Board Size, Board Composition and MFI financial sustainability 
variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Median Min Max Skewness 
Board Size 75 7.8500 2.6819 8 4 17 1.0249 
Female Composition 75 0.3405 0.2468 0.286 0 1 1.4258 
Non  executive director  75 0.8257 0.1648 0.875 0.25 1 -2.5310 
Source: Survey Data, 2012 
Table 2 Duality and Gender of CEO and MFI financial sustainability 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Median Min. Max Skewness 
CEO Duality 75 0.1000 0.3019 0 0 1 2.6667 
CEO Gender 75 0.3525 0.4838 0 0 1 0.5721 
Source: Survey Data, 2012 
 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.30, 2014 
 
81 
Table 3 Correlation Coefficients Matrix of CEO Attributes and MFI financial sustainability 
The table shows correlation exists between CEO attributes and MFI financial sustainability (ROA) for the period 
from 2000 to 2011 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Survey Data, 2012 
 
Table 4: Baseline model: Dependent variable: Return on Assets (ROA) 
POOLED MODEL (Random effects) FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
B.S 0.021
*** 
(2.741) 
- - 0.020
*** 
(3.026) 
0.0026
*** 
(5.386) 
  0.025*** 
(5.305) 
B.C  0.009
** 
(-2.57) 
 0.002 
(0.738) 
 0.004
*
 
(1.691) 
 0.003 
(1.112) 
CEOGEN   0.04502
** 
(2.487) 
0.034
** 
(3.456)
 
  0.0265
** 
(2.77) 
0.012
*** 
(-2.453) 
CEOI 1.06
*** 
(7.69) 
  1.21*** 
(5.464) 
-1.42*** 
(-1.884) 
  1.394*** 
(-1.744) 
C 2.6*** 
(25.74) 
3.04** 
(11.8) 
2.2*** 
(31.4) 
2.289** 
(9.36) 
    
R
2 
0.75 0.77 0.71 0.67 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.91 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
T 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
*** 1 percent level of significance; ** 5 percent level of significance; * 10 percent level of significance 
Source: survey data 2012 
 
             ROA           CEOGEN  
 CEOD   
ROA   1 
CEOGEN      0.493822    1 
CEOD      -0.245747        -0.339933        1 
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